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A VÁLLALATI BELSŐ TÉNYEZŐKRE ALAPOZOTT KLASSZIKUS ÉS 
MODERN STRATÉGIAELMÉLETEK EGYSÉGES KERETBE FOGLALÁSA
RIDEG ANDRÁS
Several studies have investigated the competitiveness with a focus placed on the Middle East, however, there are relatively 
few to pay attention specifically on the comparative advantages in oil trade. This paper utilizes the Balassa indices to 
shed light on the general tendencies and specific shifts in revealed comparative trade advantage of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council member states in main oil products between years 2000 and 2015. Based on our result, only four out of six GCC 
member states (Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar) were found to possess an initial competi-
tive status for at least one oil product. A tendency of generally diminishing comparative advantage in oil trade for the GCC 
group was revealed as a consequence of economic, financial, political reasons, including the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, regional instability, the Syrian conflict, fluctuating international oil prices.
Keywords: Gulf Cooperation Council, oil trade, comparative advantage
It did not take much time after the publication of Adam Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’, until another econo-
mist, David Ricardo (1772-1823) appeared on the horizon 
of modern classical economics, making an impact on the 
classical economic theory of international trade by further 
developing Smith’s ideas and bringing existing theories 
closer to depicting reality. 
According to Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, 
trading can take place even if one country has an absolute 
advantage over the other in the production of both of two se-
lected goods, because these advantages are not equal, there-
fore, the country with worse production conditions will still 
have a comparative advantage in one of the goods and the 
level of general well-being will rise (Acin, 1974, p. 46-47.). 
As a result, a country will export products that it can 
produce at a low opportunity cost (in terms of other goods 
that could be produced within the country), while it will 
import those goods which it can produce only at a com-
parative disadvantage or slight comparative advantage 
(Bernstein, 2008). 
There is no commonly accepted approach to defining 
competitiveness or competitive advantage. Certain authors 
analyse national level competitiveness while others suggest 
its application at different aggregated levels (Somogyi, 2009).
A number of studies have been conducted about com-
petitiveness in general with a focus placed on the Middle 
East, however, there are relatively few to concentrate spe-
cifically on the combination of competitiveness and com-
parative advantages in oil trade. 
Huggins et al. (2016) embrace a general approach to 
regional competitiveness, using World Competitiveness 
Index of Regions (WCIR) as an analysis framework. Au-
thors found that the competitiveness of some Middle East-
ern regions undoubtedly stems from the presence of valu-
able natural resources, however, some others achieved it 
through other means. 
With full dedication to the oil sector, AlQudah et al. 
(2016) focused on the evaluation of the impact of oil on 
the global competitiveness of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) states by using panel data techniques. The au-
thors observed that competitiveness grows parallel with 
the increase in oil prices and share of the mining sector in 
GDP, for the examined countries are heavily reliant on oil 
sector to achieve and sustain competitiveness. As a result, 
diversification efforts are bound to lead to a decrease in 
comparative advantage and trigger a tendency of dimin-
ishing competitiveness.
Finally, Almas and Hajiyev (2013) prepared an analysis 
of the existing and potential comparative advantages of 
the Azerbaijani trade, looking at a variety of goods from 
different sectors. The authors took a close look at the study 
period between 2007 and 2009 and two RCA indicators, 
the Balassa and Net Export Ratio indices were used to 
identify comparative advantages on a wide range of goods 
including agricultural products, oil products, chemical- 
and petrochemical products, as well as machineries. The 
outstandingly high numbers for the two indices both sug-
gest that Azerbaijan had a robust comparative advantage 
in crude oil within the study period.
Throughout our research it became clear that there are 
no previous studies with an analysis arrangement identical 
or even similar to the one selected for this paper, therefore, 
it is reasonable to conduct research on this topic, along with 
the lines and with the help of the tools discussed earlier.
Methodology
The modern basis of calculating comparative advan-
tages, the so-called ’B’ index was invented by Balassa 
(1965) and published in his famous study ’Trade liberali-
zation and revealed comparative advantage’. Since then, 
it has been surrounded by vivid interest, and for a handful 
of limitations have been revealed in relation to it, several 
economists felt inspired to extend and improve it further 
in the following decades, too. 
The B index gives researchers a hand to compute the 
relative comparative advantage or disadvantage for a 
product or group of products, compared to industry or the 
export market. It proposes to compute revealed compara-
tive advantage as follows: 
RCAij=Bij= (Xij/Xit)/ (Xnj/Xnt)
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RIDEG ANDRÁS where X stands for export volume, i and j represent a 
selected country and product respectively, while t and n 
stand for a certain product group and a group of countries, 
respectively (Balassa, 1965).
In theory, the index can take values from 0 to positive 
infinity. According to Balassa, an end result above 1 sug-
gests that the selected country enjoys comparative advantage 
with respect to the selected product over fellow suppliers, 
therefore, it is bound to be manifested in high export market 
share. In turn, an end result between 0 and 1 implies compar-
ative disadvantage for the selected country in contrast to fel-
low suppliers, which translates into low export market share. 
The Balassa (1965) index was found to have some limi-
tations (discussed later), which encouraged economists to 
elaborate tools which depict reality about comparative ad-
vantages in a more accurate way. Without any changes in 
the B index formula, Hinloopen - van Marrewijk (2001) 
proposed a classification system, which helps in properly 
evaluating the end results. The authors labelled their es-
tablished categories as follows:
Category A: 0 < B ≤ 1,
Category B: 1 < B ≤ 2,
Category C: 2 < B ≤ 4,
Category D: 4 < B,
where products with no comparative advantage belong to 
category A, while products with weak, moderate and strong 
comparative advantage are assigned to category B, C and D, 
respectively. This classification contributes to the proper in-
terpretation of B index values; however, it does not solve the 
problem of the lack of proportionality mentioned above.
The B index has quickly gained popularity and it has 
been widely used by many to evaluate trade advantage po-
sitions and prospects. Nevertheless, throughout the decade 
long use of B index, it became evident that besides its posi-
tive features of simplicity and ease of use, there are some 
limitations to it, too. 
Foreign trade is known for being a highly significant 
area of national economic policies, therefore, attempts from 
governments to achieve certain changes in national for-
eign trade structure in shape of direct interventions (sub-
sidization of certain industries) or restrictions are likely to 
be influential factors in every national economy (Jámbor, 
2009). The B index is rightfully criticized for disregard-
ing the impacts of these different economic policies driven 
by specific national drives, thus Siggel (2006) came to the 
conclusion that the index is more of a useful tool to capture 
competitiveness in general than to measure comparative 
advantages.
Sample and data
The study period embraces years between 2000 and 
2015. All data used for the empirical study are drawn from 
the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database of 
the World Bank (2017). Although the entire 27th chapter 
of Harmonized System (HS) deals with petroleum and its 
derivatives, over 90% of Gulf States’ export volume is 
captured by three of its subcategories, therefore, the scope 
of this paper is confined to the following three, HS-4 digit 
product codes: 2709 (Petroleum oils and oils obtained 
from bituminous minerals; crude), 2710 (Petroleum oils 
and oils from bituminous minerals, not crude; prepara-
tions n.e.c, containing by weight 70% or more of petro-
leum oils or oils from bituminous minerals; these being 
the basic constituents of the preparations; waste oils) and 
2711 (Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons). 
Missing values are in all cases substituted by zero values. 
The objective of the study is to investigate the following 
two hypotheses: 
H1: All GCC member states enjoyed revealed compar-
ative advantage in oil trade within the study period in the 
World market.
We specify that an initial competitive status means 
that a country has a comparative advantage during the 
analysed period for at least one oil product of the three 
analysed product category (crude oil, oil preparations and 
petroleum gases).
H2: The level of revealed comparative advantage of 
GCC member states in oil trade has significantly diminished 
over the study period due to political and economic reasons. 
The H2 attempt to refer to the impact of the financial 
crisis in 2008 and its aftermaths, the Syrian conflict and 
the emergence of renewable energy use. Apart from the 
interpretation of obtained results, a special emphasis is 
placed on highlighting the probable influential factors be-
hind major shifts, should they be of economic, political or 
other sorts of cause.
 
Pattern of world oil production and trade
The extraction of petroleum in industrial volumes dates 
back to the 19th century, and since then, continuous tech-
nological improvements made oil industry reach mature 
industry status. Petroleum consumption heavily damages 
the environment, while it is not true for the more and more 
affordable renewal energy, which makes some argue that 
the end of the oil era is near. However, petroleum did not 
cease to be the world’s leading source of energy, accounting 
for 32,9% of global energy consumption in 2015 (BP, 2016). 
For its utmost importance, we found petroleum suitable to 
be the commodity of interest for our empirical analysis.
Petroleum is necessary for the functioning of every 
healthy economy, however, reserves are oddly distributed 
among countries. In order to let trade happen between 
those willing to sell and buy, an active international mar-
ket was established, which is accessible to any interested 
party. The unit measure of crude oil is barrel, and although 
it is a relatively homogenous commodity, certain oil mark-
ers are in use for price benchmarking worldwide, the most 
acknowledged of which are the WTI (West Texas Inter-
mediate – high quality, light petroleum with low sulphur 
content), Brent (a combination of crude oil extracted from 
fifteen different North Sea oil fields, almost as light as 
WTI crude) and Dubai-Fateh (medium sour Dubai crude 
oil) oil types (Mikesy, 2009). NYMEX (New York Mer-
cantile Exchange) and OPEC (Organization of the Petro-
leum Exporting Countries) Basket of Crudes also serve as 
oil price benchmarking tools (Lövész, 2006).  
International oil price changes are consistently sur-
rounded by vivid interest, and the last sixteen years 
50
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
VEZETÉSTUDOMÁNY / BUDAPEST MANAGEMENT REVIEW
L . ÉVF. 2019. 5. SZ ÁM/ ISSN 0133- 0179  DOI: 10.14267/ VEZTUD.2019.05.05
brought about intensive price fluctuations. Two steep price 
drops occurred since 2000 in years 2008 and 2014.  The 
global financial crisis triggered the sharpest decline seen 
in the new millennium so far, with a 66% price drop within 
one year. The period of recovery and stabilization of crude 
oil prices around 100 USD/barrel after 2008 was ended by 
an approximately 50% decline in 2014. Lately, oil prices 
have shown a high level of instability, sinking below 30 
USD/barrel and climbing up to 50 USD/barrel since then.
Such fluctuations may be driven by a multitude of 
causes, including political events, economic and monetary 
shocks, natural disasters and as Mikesy (2009) notes, spec-
ulation activity which was proved to be one of the most 
important causes behind the robust price increase between 
2000 and 2008.
Table 1 is meant to highlight the ten most influential pe-
troleum producer and exporter countries, whose joint ex-
port volume accounts for more than 50% of total world ex-
ports. (For the first glance, the presence of Singapore in the 
top ten oil exporters may seem to be misleading. Although 
the country has no remarkable hydrocarbon reserves, it has 
huge capacities in oil refining, thus with an extremely high 
value of oil preparations exports (2710), Singapore makes 
it into the top ten). The Table 1. is below is based on histori-
cal oil trade data of World Bank (2017) from 2000 to 2015. 
Table 1 World top 10 oil exporters, 2000 and 2015
Ranking Country in billion 
USD
Share
1 Saudi Arabia 2 906 13.23%
2 Russia 2 476 11.27%
3 UAE 1 027 4.68%
4 Canada 858 3.91%
5 Norway 775 3.53%
6 United States 762 3.47%
7 Nigeria 755 3.44%
8 Kuwait 715 3.25%
9 Venezuela 658 3.00%
10 Singapore 644 2.93%
Top 10 Total 
oil export 11 581 52.71%
World Total 
oil export 21 973 100%
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
World Integrated Trade Solution database (HS-4 level, 
product code: 2709-2710)
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the world’s most im-
portant oil exporter, solely accounting for more than 13% of 
total world exports. Around 87%1 of Saudi government rev-
enues origins from the petroleum sector, which points at a 
high degree of demand risk exposure on national levels (Sau-
di Arabian Monetary Authority, 2016). Saudi policymakers 
have strived lately for mitigating this exposure, by opening 
towards renewable energy in the spirit of diversification.
The richest country in hydrocarbons worldwide, Russian 
Federation occupies the second place in leading oil export-
ers’ list by realizing more than 10% of world total oil exports 
alone. Extraction and export of crude oil and natural gas con-
stitute an element of utmost importance for Russia, as it adds 
up to more than half of the country’s federal budget revenue 
(EIA, 2015). Russia does not only excel in hydrocarbon ex-
traction but is a flagship of nuclear power generation technol-
ogy, as well as being famous for using its energy source ca-
pacities as a basis for negotiations to obtain more favourable 
positions in the field of international politics.
Occupying the third place in total export volume list, the 
United Arab Emirates maintains a wise approach towards 
hydrocarbon reserves. While it has continuously supplied 
crude oil, money inflow has been utilized for decades to 
successfully transform this federal state into a touristic and 
acknowledged financial hub (BBC, 2016b). Its architectural 
and touristic hallmarks, the widespread image of luxury, in 
addition to expertise in financial and other sorts of services 
ensure that the Emirates’ position as one of the most attrac-
tive welfare states is secured even after the end of the oil era. 
Canada is very rich in oil sand reserves, which have 
gradually become profitable to recover since the 1980s. 
Although oil sand recovery raises concern for it heavily 
damages the environment, Canada is committed to in-
creasing its production volume and expects to become the 
world’s leading oil provider till 2020 (CAPP, 2017).
One of the wealthiest states worldwide, Norway oc-
cupies the fifth place in total export volume rank list. 
Oil reserves discovered at the continental shelf under the 
North Sea and the Norwegian Sea in the 1960s stabilized 
Norway’s positions as a leading oil producer and exporter. 
Hydrocarbon exports provide a reliable source of budget 
income, contributing to achieving and maintaining out-
standingly high living standards and national prosperity 
(Norwegian Petroleum, 2017).
Role of Gulf Cooperation Council in oil trade
In this study, we selected a group of six countries 
which are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
On one hand, these states are located very close to each 
other geographically, thus their geological features are very 
similar. Beginning from the Proterozoic (800-640 million 
years ago), a sequence of tectonic movements started, pav-
ing the way for the generation of the largest part of Middle 
Eastern hydrocarbon reserves throughout the Mesozoic Era, 
252-66 million years ago (Szűcs, 2007). As a consequence 
of these tectonic movements, approximately 30% of today’s 
proved oil reserves are located beneath the Gulf States (BP, 
2016), which makes them rightfully regarded as candidates 
1 Own calculation for the years 2000-2015, based on official data released by Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (2016).
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for having high advantage in oil production, as well as being 
treated as key players from geopolitical perspective.
On the other hand, as a consequence of geographical 
proximity, these countries have highly similar historical and 
cultural background. Beginning from the spread of Islam 
-the most influential, cross border cultural shaping power of 
the region -, and the political expansion and conquests under 
its flag in the 7th century A.D., the territory of today’s Gulf 
States has always belonged to the nearest located superpow-
er of the era, should it be the Abbasid Caliphate or the Otto-
man Empire in the Middle Ages, or the British Empire in the 
modern times (Weiss – Green, 1995). In terms of cultural 
similarity, Islam left its mark on nearly every aspect of the 
way nations of the Arab Peninsula live, including architec-
ture, clothing, regional traditions and social standards.
During the 20th century, the six selected Arab states re-
alized that uniting their political will and performing joint 
actions will result in better assertion of their interest by in-
ternational superpowers, therefore they developed a high 
level of cooperation in many fields. They are member states 
of several international organizations, including: the United 
Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (which 
strives for fostering cooperation and solidarity among Is-
lamic states), the Arab League (which constitutes a politics 
driven regional bloc of Arab states), and the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, which is the exclusive political and economic 
alliance of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Besides deep-
ening the relations between member states, the Gulf Co-
operation Council aims at fostering common legislation in 
numerous fields, unification of corporate culture and syn-
chronizing the efforts put in innovation and technological 
advancement (GCC, 2017). Furthermore, four states out of 
six – namely, Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates – are members of the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
since the 1960s’, which is definitely the most significant 
influencer of oil prices in the world market (Lövész, 2006). 
Factors influencing GCC’s oil trade between 2000 
and 2015
Changes in commodity trade advantages are influ-
enced by a handful of political, economic, historic and 
other factors, the number of which is constantly increasing 
with globalization. Beside regional changes it is required 
to take into consideration every factor which might play a 
role in the change of tendencies, should they happen in the 
close neighbourhood or in a geographically remote area. 
Political influencing factors
The Arab Peninsula can be characterized by tranquil-
lity and prosperity within the study period. There were no 
armed conflicts in the region, except the Yemeni Civil War 
which began in 2015 (and since it is at the very end of the 
examined timeframe, it does not have a relevant impact on 
the results). However, the Middle East as wider environ-
ment witnessed a stormy fifteen years since 2000. There 
have been several bloody conflicts, the most significant of 
which are the following:
The Iraqi War, which was launched by the United States 
of America in 2003, driven by the US’s eagerness for fight-
ing against terrorism and spreading of democratic values (at 
least according to the official reasoning). The war lasted for 
eight years until 2011 and resulted in political chaos after 
toppling the government of Saddam Hussein (Jáni, 2011).
The Second Intifada, which is concentrated around the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict beginning from 2000. It is an 
ongoing conflict which is characterized by suicide- and 
missile attacks (Ajluni, 2003).  
The Second Lebanon War, which was a 34-day long 
armed conflict in the summer of 2006, between the forces 
of Israel and Hezbollah on the territory of South Lebanon. 
The war caused the death of thousands of soldiers as well 
as civilians (Tomolya, 2007).
The Arab Spring, which comprises the anti-govern-
ment protests in many Arab countries in 2011, resulting 
in the toppling of reigning governments in Tunisia, Lybia 
and Egypt, among others (Jones, 2012).
The Syrian Civil War, which is an ongoing bloody con-
flict since 2011. In the beginning, there were only a few par-
ties involved including government forces, the extremist 
rebels supported from outside the country, and the Kurdish 
minority forces. From 2014 onwards, additional parties got 
involved, for example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant 
(IS), and many other small militias (BBC, 2016a).
The appearance of IS terrorist organization in Iraq in 
2014, which is a focal point and key cause of bloody battles 
to this day (BBC, 2015).
Although the above list is far from being complete, it is 
evident that neighbouring Middle-Eastern societies were 
suffering from severe armed conflicts within the study pe-
riod, which definitely had an indirect impact on the price 
of oil, and through this on the oil exporter states and their 
competitiveness, too.
Decisive economic influential factors
The countries of the Arab Peninsula were gifted with 
prosperity in economic terms between 2000 and 2015, 
as huge amounts of money flow into the Gulf States be-
cause of high oil prices in the 2000s. As a consequence to 
the rapid increase in national wealth, spectacular invest-
ments took place in these countries outside of raw mate-
rial extraction, and in the spirit of diversification, other 
industries have also developed, for instance, tourism and 
banking. Nevertheless, it would be mistaken not to take in-
ternational economic tendencies into consideration, which 
had their indirect impact on Gulf economies, too. Some of 
these decisive economic happenings are as follows:
The rapid growth of the Chinese and Indian econo-
mies. The outstanding GDP growth necessary to realize 
such development implies large energy needs which have 
a positive effect on oil industry.
The monetary crisis in 2008, which had a worldwide 
impact on monetary affairs. Nonetheless, as the Gulf 
States have already been on their way to becoming more 
reliant on Islamic banking, the unique features of this al-
ternative monetary approach significantly mitigated the 
effects of the crisis (Ádám et al., 2015). 
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The nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima in 2011, which 
made national leaders rethink their energy policy world-
wide (Vivoda, 2012).
The oil price depression in 2014-2015, which brought 
about a large-scale decrease in crude oil prices, by more 
than 70% (Crude Oil Prices, 2017). It is easy to see that oil 
exporter countries were heavily hit by this change and had 
to face drastic losses of income.
It is worth mentioning that none of the listed economy 
related items has direct links to the Middle East, but still, 
they have their influencing power on the conditions of oil 
extraction and indirectly, on oil trade advantages of ex-
porter countries.
Oil trade patterns of the GCC countries
Oil is an element of utmost importance in GCC foreign 
trade, which significantly influences member states’ budget. 
Starting with the year 2000, the favourable internation-
al market environment and a steadily increasing oil price 
resulted in a tendency of rising oil export year by year, 
which was spectacularly broken by the financial crisis, 
pushing oil export to radically decrease till 2009 (331 bil-
lion USD). The years of recovery brought about a tendency 
of the increase until arriving at the highest observed value 
of the study period in 2013 (720 billion USD), followed by 
a drastic decrease in oil export in 2014-2015 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Oil trade volume for GCC countries between 
2000-2015 (in billion USD)
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
It is worthwhile to take a look at the proportion of oil 
trade to total trade for GCC countries, too. In Figure 2, we 
can observe a highly positive oil export with a share of oil 
import below 5% in GCC total trade during the entire period.
Figure 2 Proportion of oil trade to total trade for GCC 
countries, 2000-2015 (in percent)
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
The fact that the share of total oil imports is signifi-
cantly lower than total exports suggests that GCC coun-
tries realized a significant export surplus for a period ana-
lysed.  The only slight decline in exports share in 2009 
can obviously be traced back to the effects of the global 
financial crisis. Import tends to react to market environ-
ment changes to a lesser extent than exports does, which is 
due to the dominance of oil exports in total exports and as 
a consequence, a high degree of exposure to international 
oil price fluctuations.
Empirical results
As mentioned before, Balassa-index is meant to depict 
the competitiveness and comparative advantage of a certain 
market player, in terms of given products based on historical 
trade data. The study period cover (16 years), index values are 
assigned to the three most important oil product code (2709-
2711). Products under product codes 2709-2711 are referred 
to ‘crude oil’, ’oil preparations’ and ’petroleum gases’ respec-
tively.
Bahrain
According to Balassa-index figures, the competitive-
ness of Bahrain has significantly decreased since 2000. 
Even if in the first two years did the measure exceed 1, 
which is known as the lower limit of international com-
petitiveness, and the situation has just got worse with time, 
arriving at moderate B values (0,21) after 2011 (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 B-index results for oil trade Bahrain
Note: In the case of Bahrain, we have to settle for insuf-
ficient export data retrieved from World Bank (2017) WITS 
database. Most of the export values for crude oil and petro-
leum gases were missing, and substituted by zero values.
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
There are multiple reasons behind the observed pattern of 
fading competitiveness in oil preparations (2710), including the 
impacts of financial crisis in 2008 (which resulted in halving of 
B-index in next year), international oil price fluctuations, the 
finiteness of national petroleum reserves as well as the lack of 
putting big enough emphasis on technological developments, 
letting competitors take over. The loss of revealed competi-
tive advantage in oil trade is only one of the problems Bahrein 
needs to face currently – increasing public debt levels and con-
stant social unrest (originating from religious stems) constitute 
major challenges to the country. Nevertheless, the Bahraini 
economy is not likely to collapse soon, since the country boasts 
with the Gulf region’s most diversified economy. Bahrain’s 
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governance puts special emphasis on the financial sector, let-
ting the hydrocarbon sector to contribute only 20% to the GDP 
(Talal-Azimi, 2016). As a result, any shocks hitting the sector 
are less harmful to the national economy.
Kuwait
Looking at trade data and B index, it can be concluded 
that around the beginning of the new millennium, the country 
was firmly competitive in crude oil and oil preparations trade. 
Although the B index value for crude oil trade has dropped 
by nearly 33% throughout fifteen years, Kuwait managed to 
stay near to 1 in terms of competitiveness measure (1,27 in 
2015), which means the country is still an important crude oil 
(2709) supplier. However, in terms of oil preparations (2710), 
figures testify a significant decrease within the study period 
(1,6 to 0,5), meaning B-index nearly shrank to one-third of 
the initial value and Kuwait lost its international competitive-
ness. In the field of petroleum gases (2711), Kuwait was not 
regarded as competitive exporter even around 2000, while its 
positions only worsened since then (Figure 4).
Figure 4 B-index results for oil trade of Kuwait
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
The negative tendencies of competitiveness in oil prod-
ucts are a bit surprising in the light of Project Kuwait (a long-
term vision of Kuwaiti oil policy, first announced in 1997), 
Clean Fuels Project (aiming at upgrading national refineries, 
approved in June, 2011) and other projects launched between 
2000-2015, which testify national commitment towards fur-
ther increasing oil and oil derivatives production to reach 4 
million barrels/day until 2020 (sustaining this volume until 
2030) as well as increasing natural gas production to reach 4 
billion cubic feet per day until 2030 - which equals a 300% 
increase compared to the production volume achieved in 
2013 (EIA, 2013). Nevertheless, observed downward slop-
ing competitiveness patterns are explainable by the fact that 
this study concentrates on a timeframe which is regarded as 
short term in the case of such commitments, while they are 
expected to yield growth in the long-term only.
Oman
Possessing small hydrocarbon deposits compared to 
neighbouring GCC countries, yet the Sultanate of Oman 
maintains an active hydrocarbon production and trade. The B-
index for crude oil trade (2709) exceeded the lower boundary 
of competitiveness (1) in 2000 by taking a value of 1,17, how-
ever, its competitiveness melt away until 2007, only to report 
a B-index value of 0,4 (Figure 5). As a joint consequence of 
new discoveries and the use of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
techniques (EIA, 2016), a tendency of slow recovery has been 
witnessed, reaching 0,65 by 2015 (Appendix), in spite of the 
fact that low level of oil price continuously challenges the oil 
industry and has a negative impact on oil extraction. 
Figure 5 B-index results for oil trade of Oman
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
Nevertheless, the natural gas sector was the one worst 
hit by the financial crisis in 2008, as well as a drastic drop 
of B-values (0.26 to 0.01), are observed between 2014 and 
2015 (Appendix).
Qatar
Although Qatar is an important player in the field of crude 
oil extraction and trade, it is, without a doubt, the most promi-
nent player in the field of natural gas production and export. 
According to the estimate of BP (2015), 13,1% of known natu-
ral gas reserves are located under Qatari soil in 2015, which is 
mirrored in Balassa-index results, too. Qatar has been hold-
ing its competitive status, managing a duplication in its B-
index value since 2000. The key to its success lies in globally 
increasing demand for natural gas, regional stability, magni-
tude and ease of accessibility of reserves, as well as prudent 
investments in extraction technology. Based on B-index re-
sults, Qatar has not been internationally competitive in the 
fields of crude oil (2709) and oil preparations (2710) within 
the last fifteen years (Appendix), moreover, it shifted towards 
competitive disadvantage for reasons similar to those seen at 
other oil exporter GCC member states (Figure 6).
Figure 6 B-index results for oil trade of Qatar
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is worldwide known for its 
huge petroleum reserves. Although the country did not cease 
to be a player of utmost importance in the field of oil trade, 
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historical data from the last fifteen years suggest that the Saudi 
comparative advantage in oil trade is diminishing (Figure 7). 
Throughout the study period, Saudi crude oil (2709) trade has 
witnessed a little less than fifty percent loss in terms of Balas-
sa-index measure (7,44 to 4,82), which was distributed more or 
less evenly among the fifteen years of interest. Yet, the country 
exhibits a B value of around 4 between 2010 and 2015. The 
negative impacts of the global financial crisis in 2008 were not 
promptly mirrored in Saudi B values, a more significant de-
crease in comparative trade advantage is only captured in the 
B values of years 2010 and 2011 (Appendix). The delayed and 
gradual decrease highlights a positive feature of Saudi oil ex-
ports, namely the fact that events and developments outside the 
industry do not have direct influential power on export levels. 
Figure 7 B-index results for oil trade Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
As for oil preparations (2710) and petroleum gases 
(2711), changes in trade volume follow a relatively similar 
trajectory, starting from above 1,5 in the first third of the 
study period, arriving at around 0,5 in 2015. This pattern 
suggests that over fifteen years, Saudi Arabia lost its com-
parative advantage in exporting these types of goods. 
The Saudi economy relies heavily on crude oil exports, 
which definitely ensure the stability of the national economy 
in the short term. However, a question mark remains at the 
long term economic vision of the country, as both industry 
related and non-industry related factors imply that no econ-
omy is viable with an exclusive reliance on oil. On one hand, 
the exploration of shale oil and advancement of traditional 
oil extraction technology brings about a larger scale supply 
and thus a fiercer competition in the market. On the other 
hand, the generally known worldwide tendencies of shifting 
towards renewable energy sources and green technologies 
under the flag of environmental awareness are not working 
in favour of continuous oil dominance either.
The United Arab Emirates
Finally, let us take a look at the developments of oil 
trade advantages for the United Arab Emirates for the 
study period. Similar to what was observed for the other 
Gulf States, downward sloping B value is obtained after 
necessary calculations are performed. Crude oil trade 
(2709) account for the highest B value (2,3) at the begin-
ning of the new millennium, followed by oil preparations 
(1,4) and petroleum gases (0,5). All three product catego-
ries showed a decrease throughout fifteen years, the degree 
of which was in parallel to initial value sizes. Crude oil 
trade B values dropped the most, although still remaining 
at the ’competitive league’ above 1, whereas oil prepara-
tions (2710) trade has become comparatively disadvanta-
geous with a final value of slightly more than 0,5 in 2015. 
For this product type, the period between 2010 and 2012 
was characterized by unprecedented low and disappoint-
ing B values, which can neither be explained by political, 
nor financial reasons (Figure 8). Petroleum gas (2711) trade 
was not the strongest branch of UAE foreign trade even in 
2000, and in harmony with generally observed tendencies, 
B values further decreased with time since then.
Figure 8 B-index results for oil trade of the United Arab 
Emirates
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
Following the instructions of Hinloopen - van Mar-
rewijk (2001), the obtained B values are categorized and 
shown in details for each year of the study period, as a fi-
nal step of comparative advantage analysis. The observed 
distribution of B categories over time seem to confirm the 
assumptions drawn from independent country analysis 
about an overall decreasing tendency (share of A catego-
ries was increasing) in GCC competitiveness (non-com-
petitive Balassa indices) in oil trade over the course of the 
study period (Table 2).
category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
A 9 8 8 11 10 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 15 14 14 14 200
B 7 7 8 5 6 3 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 56
C 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 0 16
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 16
Total 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Table 2 Frequency of Balassa index category for 6 Gulf countries, over study period 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) WITS database
Note: Frequencies includes three oil products (2709-2711) analysed and all GCC countries for a given year. Category ‘A’ 
denotes the number of non-competitive Balassa index values while ‘B’; ‘C’; ‘D’ categories refer to the number of compe-
titive index values. The total value of the B index categories for 3 product types for 6 countries is 18 per year.
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Table 3 presents the distribution of competitiveness 
categories, highlighting individual competitiveness levels 
for certain country-product code pairs within the study 
period. Apart from outstanding competitiveness for cer-
tain pairings (for example Saudi Arabia in crude oil or Qa-
tar in petroleum gases), the dominance of non-competitive 
indices (category A) is unquestionable, thus it can serve 
as additional evidence to refute our first hypothesis (H1).
Table 3 Frequency of Balassa index category by Gulf 
countries between 2000 and 2015
Country Product code
Count of B index category




















Bahrain crude oil 16 0 0 0
oil preparations 14 2 0 0
petroleum 
gases
16 0 0 0
Kuwait crude oil 4 12 0 0
oil preparations 11 5 0 0
petroleum 
gases
16 0 0 0
Oman crude oil 13 3 0 0
oil preparations 16 0 0 0
petroleum 
gases
16 0 0 0
Qatar crude oil 16 0 0 0
oil preparations 16 0 0 0
petroleum 
gases
0 6 7 3
Saudi 
Arabia
crude oil 0 0 3 13
oil preparations 9 7 0 0
petroleum 
gases
9 7 0 0
Total 200 56 16 16
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2017) 
WITS database
Note:  Category ‘A’ refers to non-competitive Balassa 
index values. Category ‘B’; ‘C’, and ‘D’ refer to 
competitive Balassa index values. 
As a result of these factors, the level of competitiveness 
significantly dropped for all GCC countries, and only three 
countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Ku-
wait) remained to boast with comparative advantage in oil 
trade at the end of the study period which was sustained for 
not more than one oil products in the case of each country. 
In addition, the distribution of competitiveness categories 
was also decreasing for all GCC countries for the analysed 
period. This tendency persuasively suggests that H1 should 
be rejected and H2 partially can be accepted. A tendency 
of generally diminishing comparative advantage in oil 
trade for the GCC group was revealed as a consequence of 
economic, financial, political reasons, including the after-
math of the financial crisis, regional instability, the Syrian 
conflict, fluctuating international oil prices.
The GCC economies still rely on oil as the main source 
of export and fiscal revenues but they have to establish the 
non-oil economy that will be needed in the future when oil 
revenues start to drop (IMF 2014).
The EU aims to reduce their reliance on external sup-
pliers of oil and gas for 2020 (EC, 2018), thus, decreasing 
consumption of crude oil and its derived products will be 
expected in the future. 
From Hungarian aspects, investing in new technolo-
gies; widening crude oil portfolio; transforming produc-
tion from fuel to non-fuel products can be expected in the 
future (MOL, 2018). Therefore, the demand for GCC’s oil 
products might fall down in the next decades.
Conclusions and discussion
Based on a quantitative analysis conducted with com-
parative advantage measures (RCA indices), only four out 
of six GCC member states (Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) were found to 
possess an initial competitive status for at least one oil 
product of the three analysed product category, which 
clarifies the fact that H1 hypothesis needs to be rejected.
However, a tendency of generally diminishing com-
parative advantage in oil trade for the GCC group was re-
vealed as consequence of a handful of economic, financial, 
political reasons, including the aftermath of the financial 
crisis in 2008, regional instability, fluctuating interna-
tional oil price levels (H2). As a result of these factors, 
the level of competitiveness significantly dropped for all 
GCC countries, and only three countries (Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) remained to boast with 
comparative advantage in oil trade at the end of the study 
period (which was sustained for not more than one oil 
products in the case of each country). 
In light of the study outcome, our suggestions for GCC 
member states - to keep their current positions in the league 
of developed oil trader countries - would be as follows:
Carry on and broaden the pool of efforts devoted to mit-
igating their present excessive exposure to the oil industry. 
Since most of these countries have already launched long 
term national projects aiming at economic diversification, 
what they need now is only the enforcement of adherence 
to the cornerstones already laid down in these visions.
GCC societies should foster tighter cooperation with 
each other. These countries already realized that they have 
many things common, which facilitates maintaining a co-
operative and mutually assistive approach. For instance, 
sharing the same culture and language opens the doors of 
making further steps towards a more centralized law en-
forcement and bureaucracy, which is bound to be more cost-
efficient than what these elements of statehood cost today.
Stagnation of oil prices at low levels and falling energy 
demand of the EU and the World has compelled these coun-
tries lately to give up their squandering social benefit provi-
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sion policy, which – is going forth along the same lines – is 
a measure that undoubtedly contributes to a healthier eco-
nomic structure. 
Finally, it should be noticed that our study also has some 
limitation. Trade values required to perform computations 
of Balassa indices were missing in some cases, which had 
to be handled in applying substitution of missing values by 
0 (in that case zero trade flows were assumed). The model 
of the revealed comparative advantage assumes homoge-
nous products traded and perfect competition in interna-
tional markets. The deviation of market conditions from 
perfection might provide directions for future research.
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Appendix 
Individual B-index results for oil trade for GCC countries
Source: own calculation based on sample data
product code Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
crude oil United Arab 
Emirates
2.64 2.55 1.98 2.09 2.10 2.04 1.66 1.82 1.46 1.50 1.47 1.25 1.40 1.13 1.14 1.26
oil preparations United Arab 
Emirates





0.89 0.89 0.48 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.66 0.18 0.14 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.40
crude oil Bahrain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
oil preparations Bahrain 1.14 1.12 1.12 0.97 0.72 0.66 0.52 0.55 0.25 0.28 0.42 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.21
petroleum gases Bahrain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
crude oil Kuwait 1.34 1.47 1.13 1.14 1.22 0.00 1.13 1.19 1.05 1.02 0.83 0.93 0.00 1.02 1.09 1.27
oil preparations Kuwait 1.56 1.38 1.48 1.35 1.15 0.00 0.82 0.94 0.64 0.82 0.69 0.57 0.00 0.47 0.48 0.53
petroleum 
gases
Kuwait 0.40 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.17
crude oil Oman 1.05 1.17 1.02 0.82 0.67 0.66 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.48 0.47 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.55 0.65
oil preparations Oman 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.09
petroleum 
gases
Oman 0.00 0.59 0.57 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.01
crude oil Qatar 0.46 0.86 0.40 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.49 0.59 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.39
oil preparations Qatar 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.14
petroleum 
gases
Qatar 1.80 2.07 1.87 1.60 1.70 1.56 1.58 2.04 2.33 2.21 3.72 3.91 4.40 3.83 4.14 4.54
crude oil Saudi Arabia 7.44 7.80 7.60 7.02 6.81 6.90 4.98 5.49 4.48 4.90 4.27 3.86 4.43 3.80 3.95 4.82
oil preparations Saudi Arabia 1.31 1.94 1.56 1.50 1.67 1.55 1.01 0.89 0.63 0.79 0.66 0.52 0.50 0.36 0.54 0.71
petroleum 
gases
Saudi Arabia 1.73 1.24 1.53 1.41 1.24 1.06 0.96 1.07 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.33 0.37
